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I. INTRODUCTION

For at least the past two decades, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
has relied heavily on the private benefit doctrine to police economic
transactions between tax-exempt charities and for-profit entities. The
doctrine has been used to regulate the size of the charitable class needed
to justify exemption,' prohibit joint-venture transactions between
nonprofits and individuals or for-profit entities,2 regulate employee
recruiting," and possibly serve as a substantive constraint on contracts with
third parties.4 Despite the IRS's broad invocation of private benefit as a
policing tool, however (or perhaps precisely because of its broad
invocation of it), no one really can define the doctrine. The only thing
close to an official definition comes from an IRS General Counsel's
Memorandum issued in 1987, which noted that:
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it
serves a private interest more than incidentally ....
A pnvate benefit is considered incidental only if it is
incidental in both a qualitative and a quantitative sense. In
order to be incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must
be a necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the
public at large, i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by
enefitting certain private individuals .... To be incidental
in a quantitative sense, the private benefit must not be
substantial after considering the overall public benefit

1. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
2. E.g., Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 IRB LEXIS 94, at *1, *24 (prohibiting an
exempt nonprofit hospital from contributing all its operating assets to a joint venture with a forprofit investor unless the nonprofit retains control of the venture); see infra notes 64-67 and
accompanying text. The doctrine also looms large in joint ventures between exempt organizations
and for-profit investors engaged in low-income housing construction. See Jerry 0. Allen and Alan
D. Duffy, Solving the Low-Income Tax CreditHousing PartnershipDilemma, 49 EXEMPT ORG.
TAx REV. 319,323 (2005); see also Nicholas A. Mirkay, Relinquish Control!Why the IRS Should
Change Its Stance on Exempt Organizationsin Ancillary Joint Ventures, 6 NEV. L.J. 21, 22-23
(2005).
3. E.g., Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121, 1997 IRB LEXIS 139, at *1-9 (setting forth
situations in which physician recruitment incentives are consistent with exemption). In this ruling,
the IRS set forth four main principles applying to recruitment incentives, including, "[tihird, the
organization may not engage in substantial activities that cause the hospital to be operated for the
benefit of a private interest rather than public interest so that it has a substantial non-exempt
purpose." Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(3)- l); see infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
4. E.g., United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Cormn'r, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting
that the private benefit doctrine might be an appropriate tool to police the contractual relationship
between the United Cancer Council and its independent fund-raiser, though rejecting application
of the private inurement limitation to this situation); see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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conferred by the activity.'
This is a quintessential balancing test under which the IRS both owns and
reads the scale, leaving charities completely at sea regarding the possible
ill effects of transactions with for-profit entities. But the larger problem is
that no one even knows what to balance, since practically any transaction
undertaken by an exempt charity will result in benefit to some private
party outside the charitable class. For example, when the Salvation Army
buys food to feed the homeless, food retailers profit from the sales. Ditto
for the trailer manufacturers or hotel operators that benefit when the Red
Cross provides temporary shelter for disaster victims. We all assume these
transactions fall into the "incidental" category and do not result in private
benefit problems. But one court decision proclaimed that a "secondary"
private benefit flowing to a major political party, as a byproduct of an
exempt educational organization that trained political campaign
operatives, was not incidental,6 and to date only one academic has
attempted a more comprehensive explanation. 7
In an attempt to provide some additional clarity to the doctrine, in
September 2005 the IRS proposed regulations that would add some
examples to Treasury Regulation § 1.501 (c)(3)- I(d)(l)(ii) to illustrate the
application of the private benefit doctrine These examples, however, are
as widely varied as the IRS's previous invocation of the doctrine and seem
at first glance to offer little in the way of guidance concerning what the
doctrine means and when it realistically becomes a transactional problem.9
In the past I have expressed my displeasure with the private benefit
doctrine in writing, explicitly calling for its demise.'" But I have come to

5. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, 1987 GCM LEXIS 2, at *14-16 (Jan. 23, 1987).
6. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1075 (1989).
7. See Darryll K. Jones, PrivateBenefit and the Unanswered Questionsfrom Redlands
Surgical Services, 29 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 433,444 (2000) (arguing that private benefit occurs
when "a select and identifiable group [is] granted a priority right of beneficial interaction with [an
exempt] entity").
8. Standards for Recognition of Tax-Exempt Status if Private Benefit Exists or If an
Applicable Tax-Exempt Organization Has Engaged in Excess Benefit Transaction(s), 70 Fed. Reg.
53,599, 53,600-02 (proposed Sept. 9, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53). For a further
discussion of these examples in light of the proposals presented in this Article, see infra notes 15365 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Dennis B. Drapkin, ABA Members Comment on ProposedRegson Recognition
of Tax-Exempt Status, Intermediate Sanctions, 51 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 159, 160-61 (2006)
("We are concerned, however, that the addition to the regulations of the three relatively narrow
examples.., is likely to produce more confusion than clarification.") (footnotes omitted).
10. See John D. Colombo, A FrameworkforAnalyzingExemption and UBITEffects ofJoint
Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 187, 194 (2001) [hereinafter Colombo, Analyzing Exemption]
("'[P]rivate benefit' should have no appropriate role in analyzing exempt status other than its
traditional common-law role of ensuring that a 'charity' serves a sufficiently broad charitable
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accept that (1) the doctrine isn't going away, (2) it is unreasonable for me
to ask the IRS to simply abandon an effective policing tool, and perhaps
most importantly, (3) a properly-defined private benefit doctrine has a
place in analyzing how exempt entities interact with for-profit entities or
individuals. So in place of my past position of "just get rid of it," this
Article attempts to identify both a specific rationale for the private benefit
doctrine and the paradigm transactions to which it should apply.
Specifically, the Article suggests that the private benefit doctrine
should be invoked in cases in which transactions carry substantial risk that
the charity is "failing to conserve" charitable assets for the charitable class.
I identify two paradigm situations in which the risk of such failure to
conserve may be especially high: (1) A charitable entity transacts with an
individual or for-profit entity in order to provide "core services" (services
that form the basis for tax exemption) to the beneficiaries of the charity
(the "outsourcing" paradigm), or (2) the charity enters into a transaction
with a for-profit entity or individual involving these core services that
confers a competitive advantage on the for-profit in its own business
activities (the "competitive advantage" paradigm). In situation (1), the
failure to conserve may be the result of paying a profit margin to the forprofit entity to perform services that the charity might be able to provide
as efficiently (or more efficiently) directly. In situation (2), the failure to
conserve may be the failure to capture the full value of the competitive
benefit conferred by the charity on the for-profit. In either situation, the
charity should be required to present a reasonable justification that the
transaction in question does not "waste" charitable resources in order to
maintain the charity's tax exemption.
Since this Article calls for a considerably narrower application of the
private benefit doctrine than has recently been the norm, I suspect that
when I am done, the IRS may be no happier with my new found
appreciation for private benefit than with my prior disdain for it. On the
other hand, perhaps recent events, particularly the IRS's promulgation of
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 regarding ancillary joint ventures, evidence a
new willingness by the IRS to re-examine its use of the private benefit
doctrine.

class."); John D. Colombo, PrivateBenefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Healthcare as an
Exempt Purpose,34 J. HEALTHL. 505,521 (2001) [hereinatler Colombo, PrivateBenefit] (arguing
that "private benefit as a separate doctrine simply adds nothing to the analysis of the exemption
effects of transactions between exempt entities and for-profit investors.").
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IX. BACKGROUND: How WE LOST PRIVATE BENEFIT"

A. PrivateInurement vs. PrivateBenefit andEarly History
Once upon a time, there was the statute, and only the statute, and the
statute said, "Thou shalt not inure." Or more exactly, the 1909 predecessor
to § 501 (c)(3) of the Code, which provides tax exemption for "charitable"
organizations, contained a limitation that an organization qualified for
exemption only if "no part of the profit of which inures to the benefit of
any private stockholder or individual."' 2 This "private inurement"
language survives in slightly-altered form in today's §501 (c)(3), providing
exemption only if "no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual."' 3 Meanwhile, in
regulations adopted in 1959, the IRS included a phrase in Treasury
Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) that forms the basis of the modem
private benefit doctrine. 4 This regulation reads:
An organization is not . . . [qualified for
exemption] ... unless it serves a public rather than a private
interest. Thus . . . it is necessary for an organization to

establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of
private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or
his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests. 5
Despite somewhat odd language that invites some strange literal
interpretations, 6 the statutory private inurement prohibition has been welldefined over the years through both court decisions and IRS
interpretations. The prohibition refers to "siphoning off' the income or
assets of the exempt organization via non-arm's-length transactions with
"insiders."' 7 Inurement transactions are usually far from subtle and involve
11. Parts of the discussion in this section are copied or adapted from a previous article I
authored and are used with permission. See Colombo, PrivateBenefit, supranote 10.
12. 44 Cong. Rec. 4157 (1909), quoted in Harvey P. Dale, The Crux of Charity:Inurement,
PrivateBenefit, and Excess Benefit Transactions, in NATIONAL CENTER ON PHILANTHROPY AND
THE LAW, DIVERSIONS OF CHARITABLE ASSETS: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 1, 5 (2004 conference

materials) (on file with author).
13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
14. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (2006).
15. Id.
16. See Dale, supranote 12, at 7-12.
17. See FRANCIS R. HuL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

4.03 (2006); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 19.1 (7th ed.
1998); United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) ("A charity
is not to siphon its earnings to its founder, or the members of its board, or their families, or anyone
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two basic paradigms: (1) The charity pays more than fair market value for
property owned by or services provided by an insider, or (2) the charity
charges less than fair market value for property or services the charity
provides to an insider. So, for example, a charity's paying excessive
compensation to an officer constitutes inurement, as does a charity's
charging inadequate rent to an officer on property it owns.'" Today, the
private inurement limitation largely has been supplanted by I.R.C. § 4958
(what was once known as the "intermediate sanctions" legislation), which
provides statutory remedies short of loss of tax exemption for these
siphoning transactions.' 9
The private benefit doctrine, on the other hand, does not appear
anywhere in the statute. On first glance, the language in the regulation
cited above would seem to be little more than an augmented explanation
of the statutory private inurement limitation. For example, when the
regulation states that an exempt charity must not be "organized or operated
for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the
creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or persons
controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests," 20 it appears
that the regulation is discussing mostly insiders of the organization: the
creator, shareholders, or parties controlled by them. Indeed, the classic
ejusdem generis maxim of statutory interpretation would call for the
general term in this regulation ("private interests") to be limited by the
expression of the specific examples, which are designatedindividuals,the
creator and shareholders, all words that seem to convey an insider
relationship with the entity. Perhaps because Treasury Regulation
§ 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (c)(1) refers more explicitly to inurement, however, the IRS
over the past thirty years has viewed the private benefit language as a
else fairly to be described as an insider, that is, as the equivalent of an owner or manager."); see
also Darryll K. Jones, The ScintillaoflndividualProfit:In Search ofPrivateInurement andExcess
Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REv. 575, 595 (2000) (defining "strict accounting private inurement" as
transactions in which assets of an exempt organization are siphoned off to insiders).
18. For a convenient list of, and case citations for, common inurement transactions beyond
paying excessive compensation, see, for example, HELL & MANCINo, supra note 17, at 4.03[7].
19. Section 4958 provides for excise taxes on an "excess benefit transaction," defined as a
transaction in which "the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the
consideration [] received." I.R.C. § 4958(c) (2000). This is the § 4958 analog to the "siphoning off"
concept in private inurement. Excess benefit transactions can occur only between an exempt
organization and a "disqualified person," defined as a person who, during the preceding five years,
was "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization." Id.
§ 4958(f). This is the § 4958 analog to the "insider" concept. The IRS retains authority to revoke
exempt status for inurement transactions, although most observers agree that revocation will be a
sort of "last resort" sanction for egregious or repeated conduct. In fact, much of the proposed
regulations project cited in note 8 is concerned with defining situations in which the IRS will
revoke exemption for § 4958 violations.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii).
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separate limitation on exempt status.
Nevertheless, there has been considerable historic confusion regarding
the scope of the private benefit doctrine. In early rulings and cases, the
views of both the IRS and the courts seemed to be that the private benefit
doctrine was a restatement of the common law requirement that a charity
serve a broad charitable class.22 This requirement comes from the common
law of charitable trusts, which the IRS has indicated underlies the
definition of "charitable" in § 501(c)(3).23 Under charitable trust law, for
example, a trust set up to maintain a public graveyard was charitable, but
not one to maintain an individual's private tomb. 24 In the classic commonlaw sense, therefore, private benefit referred to a lack of a sufficientlybroad charitable class. Both cases and IRS rulings prior to the latter half
of the 1970s seemed to adopt this reading of "private benefit." For
example, in Revenue Ruling 75-286, the IRS held that an organization
dedicated to improving one city block (and limiting its members to
residents of that block) violated the private benefit prohibition because it
did not serve a large enough class,25 even though the IRS had held
previously that an organization devoted to beautifying an entire city would

qualify. 26 At the same time, however, the IRS had recognized that virtually

all charitable organizations confer private benefits as a byproduct of
performing their charitable services. 7 As long as the charitable class
served by the organization was broad enough, such incidental benefits
would not harm exempt status.28
By the last half of the 1970s, however, the IRS began using "private
benefit" in a much different context. The shift in attitude towards private
benefit appeared in both certain rulings and litigation positions taken by

21. See Mirkay, supranote 2, at 64.
22. See id.
23. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) ("[C]haritable is used in section 501(c)(3) in its
");Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586, 588
generally accepted legal sense ....
(1983) ("[U]nderlying all relevant parts of the Code... [are] certain common law standards of
charity .... The origins of such exemptions lie in the special privileges that have long been
extended to charitable trusts.") (footnote omitted); Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (relying on
fact that promotion of health had long been considered charitable under the law of charitable trusts
as rationale for exempting nonprofit hospital).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 cmt. h (1959); see also AUSTIN WAKEMAN
SCOTT & WILLAM FRANKLIN, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 375.3 n.8 (4th ed. 1989) (citing numerous
cases of charitable trusts).
25. Rev. Rul 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, 1975 IRB LEXIS 193, at *1, *4.
26. Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 243, 1968 IRB LEXIS 585, at *1.
27. E.g., Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129, 1970 IRB LEXIS 607, at *3 (finding that
organization formed to maintain public recreation area was not denied exemption because it
incidentally benefitted owners of shoreline property).
28. Id., 1970 IRB LEXIS 607, at *3.
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the IRS at this time.29 For example, in HardingHospital, Inc. v. United
States,3" the IRS argued that excessive private benefit resulted from the
fact that the existence of the particular psychiatric hospital in question was
necessary for the doctors to practice their special "milieu therapy" on
patients.3" This argument focused not on the size of the charitable class,
but on the benefits flowing to other private individuals in serving the
charitable class. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, but ultimately
upheld revocation of exempt status on traditional private inurement
grounds.32 Similarly, in a series of cases dealing with "medical practice
plans" associated with exempt medical schools, the courts rejected
persistent IRS arguments that these plans violated the private benefit
doctrine where the facts showed that the doctors involved had received
reasonable compensation and thus did not suffer from traditional private
inurement violations.33
This expanded view of private benefit also appeared in IRS rulings. In
Revenue Ruling 76-206, the IRS held that a foundation that supported
classical programming on an individual radio station was not charitable
29. In fact, one can trace this shift back to Rev. Rul. 69-545, where the IRS ruled that
Hospital B in its comparison of exempt (Hospital A) and non-exempt (Hospital B) hospitals was
operated for the benefit of private interests given that the hospital's medical staff was closed and
70% of its board consisted of members of that closed staff who also had owned the hospital as a
proprietary institution before converting it to nonprofit status. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117,
1969 IRB LEXIS 176, at *3, *7-8. The IRS ruled that under the circumstances, Hospital B was
providing a private benefit to the staff doctors. Id., 1969 IRB LEXIS 176, at *8. As with later
rulings and litigation positions, this view of private benefit focused on benefits flowing to
individuals or entities as a result of serving the charitable class, not on the breadth of the charitable
class. Id., 1969 IRB LEXIS 176, at *9-10.
30. 505 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1974).
31. Id. at 1076; see John D. Colombo, Are Associations ofDoctors Tax-Exempt? Analyzing
Inconsistencies in the Tax-Exemption of Health Care Providers, 9 VA. TAX REV. 469, 485-86
(1990).
32. HardingHosp., 505 F.2d at 1078 (concluding that both payment of management fee and
below-market office rent are not arm's-length); see Colombo, supra note 31, at 487.
33. See generallyUniv. of Md. Physicians, P.A. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 732 (1981)
(holding that a professional service corporation was tax-exempt because the total compensation
paid to physician-employees was reasonable); Univ. ofMass. Med. Sch. Group Practice v. Comm'r,
74 T.C. 1299 (1980) (holding that petitioner school group, comprised of teaching members, paid
a reasonable salary to its members, and was therefore deemed a charitable organization under
§ 501(c)(3)); B.H.W. Anesthesia Found., Inc. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 681 (1979) (holding that
organization of teaching anesthesiologists was tax-exempt because physicians were reasonably
compensated). All these cases involved a common core of facts: In order to provide higher
compensation levels to the teaching doctors at these medical schools, each had formed a "practice
plan" that collected fees from the doctors' private practice of medicine and then paid a certain
portion of those fees back to the doctors as compensation. The IRS had argued in each case that the
practice plan constituted nothing more than an organization collecting fees for the doctors, and
hence excessive private benefit was present even if the doctors were paid reasonable amounts
(negating any claim of private inurement). See Colombo, supra note 31, at 492-95.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/3

8

BENEFIT Benefit
OF PRIVATE
IN SEARCH
Colombo:
In Search
of Private

1071

because the monetary support the foundation provided to the radio station
was an excessive private benefit.34 In Revenue Ruling 76-152, the IRS
found that an art gallery dedicated to displaying and selling the work of a
limited number of local artists who received 90% of the sales proceeds was
also guilty of excessive private benefit.35 In both these cases, like the
litigation position taken by the IRS in HardingHospital,the focus in the
ruling was not on the size of the charitable class, but rather the economic
benefits that flowed to a for-profit entity or individual as a result of serving
the charitable class.
At this same time, the private benefit doctrine also became prominent
in IRS rulings dealing with partnership or joint-venture transactions
between exempt charities and for-profit entities. Until 1979, the IRS had
taken the position that the participation of an exempt entity as a general
partner in a joint venture with private investors constituted a per se
violation of the private inurement doctrine.3 6 In 1979, after the Tax Court
ruled in favor of an exempt organization's participation in a partnership
with private investors in Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v.
Commissioner,3 7 the IRS reversed course and declared in General Counsel
Memorandum 37,852 that joint ventures would not necessarily result in
loss of exempt status, and that a case-by-case assessment of such

34. Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154, 1976 IRB LEXIS 624, at *1, *4-5.
35. Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976-1 C.B. 151, 1976 IRB LEXIS 621, at *1-4.
36. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,259, 1977 GCM LEXIS 372, at *1, *8, *14-15
(Sept. 19, 1977) (concluding that a tax-exempt educational organization would lose its exemption
if it entered into a contract with a commercial film distributor); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293,
1975 GCM LEXIS 215, at *2, *31-32 (May 30, 1975) (entering into a partnership to procure
private venture capital to fund a housing project is not compatible with exempt purposes). See
generally H1LL & MANClNO, supra note 17, at 29.041I], at 3-44. One should note that an exempt
entity's participation in a partnership as a limited partner did not raise similar problems with
exempt status, presumably because the exempt organization in such an arrangement had no
fiduciary duties to advance the interests of private investors and it would not incur the risk of
liability of a general partner. See James J. McGovern, Partnershipsor Joint Ventures as Vehicles
to Achieve CharitableObjectives, 31 CATH. LAW 112, 117-19 (1987).
37. 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aft'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). Plumstead involved a newlyformed exempt performing arts association that decided to stage a play (The First Monday in
October, featuring Henry Fonda) at the Kennedy Center in order to raise funds for its operations.
Id. at 1327. To fund production costs for that play, the exempt organization entered into a
partnership with private investors. Id. at 1328. The IRS claimed the partnership arrangement was
inconsistent with exempt status because the duty of Plumstead as general partner was to maximize
profits, thus conferring an impermissible private benefit on the limited partners. Id. at 1333. The
Tax Court held for the exempt organization, however, noting that staging plays was exactly the
exempt purpose for which the arts organization was formed, and that none of the limited partners
had any control over the operations of the arts organization or the partnership. Id. at 1333-34. The
play, by the way, apparently was a flop (Plumstead closed the play at a loss). See James J.
McGovern, The Tax Consequencesof a Charity'sParticipationas a GeneralPartnerin a Limited
PartnershipVenture, 29 TAx NOTES 1261, 1264 (1985).
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arrangements would be appropriate.38 In a series of private rulings and
General Counsel memoranda that followed, the IRS refined its position,
making clear that the primary issue involved injoint venture arrangements
focused on the balance between the claimed advancement in charitable
purpose from the venture and the private benefits conferred on individual
investors.39 Thus in 1983, in General Counsel Memorandum 39,005, the
IRS adopted a two-part analysis that first determined whether the objective
of the partnership was charitable, and then closely examined the
partnership arrangement "to see whether the arrangement permits the
exempt organization to act exclusively in furtherance of the purposes for
which exemption may be granted and not for the benefit of the limited
partners."' Four years later, in General Counsel Memorandum 39,598,41
the IRS provided more detailed analysis of private benefit issues.
Referring explicitly to the private benefit doctrine, the IRS stated,
An organization is not described in section 501(c)(3) if it
serves a private interest more than incidentally. .

.

. If,

however, the private benefit is only incidental to the exempt
purposes served, and not substantial, it will not result in a loss
of exempt status....
A private benefit is considered incidental only if it is
incidental in both a qualitative and a quantitative sense. In
order to be incidental in a qualitative sense, the benefit must
be a necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the
public at large, i.e., the activity can be accomplished only by
benefitting certain private individuals.... To be incidental in
a quantitative sense, the private benefit must not be
substantial after considering the overall public benefit
conferred by the activity.42
Put more succinctly, General Counsel Memorandum 39,598 established
private benefit as a major factor separate from private inurement in
analyzing the effect of joint ventures on exempt status. This General
Counsel Memorandum also established the two main differences between
private benefit and private inurement: (1) the approach of balancing public
38. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,852, 1979 GCM LEXIS 52, at *1-2 (Feb. 15, 1979). See
generally HILl & MANCINO, supra note 17, at 29.04[ 1], at 3-45.
39. See Darryll K. Jones, SpecialAllocationsandPreferentialDistributions
in Joint Ventures
Involving Taxable and Tax Exempt Entities, 31 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 13, 23 (2005).
40. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005, 1983 GCM LEXIS 56, at *8-9 (June 28, 1983). See
McGovern, supra note 37, at 1265.
41. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598, 1987 GCM LEXIS 2, at *1-2, *31 (Jan. 23, 1987)
(finding that a proposed rental of office building space by a subsidiary of an exempt hospital to a
group of doctors was inconsistent with exempt status).
42. Id, 1987 GCM LEXIS 2, at *14-16 (citations omitted).
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versus private benefit in making case-by-case determinations regarding
43
whether particular transactions had violated the private benefit doctrine,
as opposed to the general rule that any amount of private inurement
resulted in loss of exemption, and (2) applying private benefit doctrine
beyond "insiders" to any economic arrangement with persons or entities
outside the charitable class."
B. Modern Application: From American Campaign Academy
to Revenue Ruling 2004-51
As of the late 1980s, however, the IRS's expanded definition of private
benefit still awaited judicial approval, which was not long in coming. In
American CampaignAcademy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court analyzed
the case of a school that trained individuals to be political campaign
professionals. 45 Although the school clearly served a large charitable class
(e.g., it did not limit admissions to particular individuals)' and also clearly
met the tests for an "educational organization" under § 501 (c)(3),47 the Tax
Court used the private benefit doctrine to hold that the organization was
not exempt.48 Noting that most of the school's graduates worked for the
Republican Party or its related entities, the court found that the school
benefitted the private interests of the Republican Party to an impermissible
degree and hence was not exempt, even though no evidence of traditional
private inurement existed.49
American CampaignAcademy was a watershed in the private benefit
doctrine for at least two reasons. First, the court clearly sided with the
IRS's contention that private benefit constituted a separate limitation from
private inurement, and was not limited to the traditional "insider

43. Id., 1987 GCM LEXIS 2, at *16-17. The Memorandum appeared to adopt a sort of "but
for" analysis in applying private benefit, noting in the ruling that the taxpayer in question had not
sufficiently explored alternatives that could have accomplished its objective with less private
benefit. Id., 1987 GCM LEXIS 2, at *20-21. In General Counsel Memorandum 39,732, however,
the IRS rejected the proposition that a joint venture would pass muster only if the exempt entity
could show it was the only way to pursue the charitable purpose at issue, thus apparently burying
the "but for" analysis. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 19, 1988). See HILL & MANCINO,
supranote 17, at 3.05, at 3-48.
44. See Colombo, PrivateBenefit, supra note 10, at 516-17; Dale, supranote 12, at 13.
45. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1055 (1989).
46. Id. at 1058. The court's opinion indicates some skepticism regarding whether the school
took students who did not have Republican Party affiliations, but the record did not indicate such
a limitation, and the IRS conceded that the Academy did not discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity, or national origin. Id.
47. Id at 1063 (stating the IRS conceded this point).
48. Id. at 1079.
49. Id at 1073-79
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siphoning" of the latter doctrine.5" Second, the court adopted the IRS's
"balancing" approach that compared private benefits to outsiders not a part
of the charitable class with the direct benefits to the charitable class. 5' The
court opinion analyzed both "primary" and "secondary" benefits flowing
from the American Campaign Academy (ACA).52 The court accepted the
fact that the primary benefit of ACA was the education that flowed to
ACA's students, and that, in absence of record evidence that ACA
inappropriately limited admissions, the student body was a sufficiently
large charitable class.53 Nevertheless, because most of ACA's graduates
ended up working for the Republican Party, substantial secondary private
benefit flowed to the Party and hence supported a finding that
5 4 the
Academy was not operated "exclusively" for charitable purposes.
Armed with the approval of American CampaignAcademy, the IRS
quickly made private benefit a cornerstone of exemption analysis. As was
the case with the development of the doctrine in the late 1970s and early
1980s, partnership/joint-venture transactions, particularly in the health care
sector, became the test beds for the expanded private benefit doctrine postAmerican CampaignAcademy. In November 1991, the IRS issued General
Counsel Memorandum 39,862, which used private benefit analysis to nix
revenue-stream joint venture arrangements between hospitals and
doctors.55 These arrangements, in which hospitals would "spin-off' certain
outpatient services to a joint venture between the hospital and doctors,
were used by hospitals as a means of increasing utilization of hospital
facilities by giving doctors a direct economic stake in the spun-off
facility.56 The hope was that the participating doctors would refer more
patients to the facility, thus increasing revenues to the hospital. In the
Memorandum, the IRS ruled that these arrangements violated the private
benefit doctrine, because the direct and substantial financial benefit to the
participating doctors could not be justified as incidental to the hospital's
mission of providing health services to the community." According to the
IRS, "Obtaining referrals or avoiding new competition may improve the
competitive position of an individual hospital, but that is not necessarily

50. Id. at 1069.
51. Id. at 1074-76.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1071-74.
54. Id. at 1073-79. "Exclusively" really means "primarily" in this context. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)- 1(c) (2006).
55. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, 1991 GCM LEXIS 39, at *1-2. (Nov. 22, 1991).
56. Id., 1991 GCM LEXIS 39, at *1-2; see also 1 DOUGLAS M. MANcINO, TAXATION OF
HOSPITALS AND HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS § 19.04(2005) (noting that net revenue stream joint
ventures were used by hospitals as a means of "solidifying a referral base or deterring the
physicians from establishing their own, competing, facilities and services").
57. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, 1991 GCM LEXIS 39, at *1-2 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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the same as benefitting its community."58 The IRS, however, indicated in
a later part of the Memorandum that if a joint venture was needed to
expand health care resources in the area, create a new provider, reduce
treatment costs, or provide new treatment modalities, then the arrangement
might pass muster.59
The private benefit analysis also played a key role in two major
healthcare exemption rulings released by the IRS in the late 1990s.
Revenue Ruling 97-21, dealing with physician recruitment, involved two
separate situations. 6' The first concerned financial incentives to recruit a
physician to be an employee of a hospital or other provider, and the second
related to financial incentives to recruit doctors to the community to be on
staff, but not as employees of the hospital.6' While private inurement
analysis controlled the first situation, the IRS relied on private benefit
analysis in the second, holding that reasonable incentives would be
permitted when the recruitment was justified by community need,
expanding services provided by the hospital, or providing new services to
the community. 62 Recruitment that simply enhanced the hospital's own
bottom line (by recruiting a physician already in the community and
providing services to the community at another hospital) would not be
permitted under the private benefit test, presumably because such a move
would not enhance services to the community.63
In the second major ruling, Revenue Ruling 98-15, the IRS examined
the whole-hospital, joint-venture transaction in which an existing exempt
hospital corporation would contribute all its assets (the hospital building,
equipment, contracts with staff and providers, etc.) to a joint venture with
a for-profit hospital chain.' Typically, these transactions were structured
as fifty-fifty partnerships. The for-profit provider would contribute cash
to the deal, equal to the value of the assets contributed by the exempt
partner, and a for-profit management company (usually affiliated in some
way with the for-profit partner) would manage the business via a contract
with the partnership.65 Using private benefit analysis as its main analytical

58. Id., 1991 GCM LEXIS 39, at *30-47.
59. Id., 1991 GCM LEXIS 39, at *67 ("We recognize that there may well be legitimate
purposes for joint ventures, whether analyzed under the anti-kickback statute or the Tax Code.
These may include raising needed capital; bringing new services or a new provider to a hospital's
community; sharing the risk inherent in a new activity, or pooling diverse areas of expertise.").
60. Rev. Rul. 97-21, 1997-1 C.B. 121, 1997 IRB LEXIS 139, at *1-2.
61. Id., 1997 IRB LEXIS 139, at *14-16.
62. Id., 1997 IRB LEXIS 139, at *16-19.
63. See id., 1997 IRB LEXIS 139, at *8, *19-20; 1 MANCINO,supranote 56, at § 20.02[4][fl.
64. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 IRB LEXIS 97, at *1.
65. For extended discussions of this ruling, see 1 MANCINO, supranote 56, at § 19.04[5][a];
THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS 22.9, at 373-78 (2d ed. 2001).
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tool, the IRS concluded that these whole-hospital joint-venture
arrangements were consistent with exempt status only if the exempt
partner retained control over the management of the joint venture, a
position later upheld by the courts.66 The IRS noted that in cases where the
exempt organization did not retain management control, it could not
initiate programs to meet the health needs of its community, and other
community benefit programs such as free care for the poor could be
terminated.67 As in General Counsel Memorandum 39,862, the IRS refused
to view the economic advantages of the joint venture arrangement as a
sufficient counterbalance to the private benefits flowing to the for-profit
partner and the for-profit management company.
Finally, private benefit made a gratis appearance in Judge Posner's
opinion in United CancerCouncil,Inc. v. Commissioner.6' The defendantcharity United Cancer Council (UCC) had entered into an agreement with
a private, for-profit fundraising firm, Watson & Hughey.69 Of the $28.8
million raised, only $2.3 million actually went to UCC-less than 10% of
the gross. 70 Although the case primarily centered on the issue of whether
an arm's length agreement with a for-profit fundraiser could result in
private inurement (a proposition soundly rejected by the Seventh Circuit),
at the close of his opinion, Judge Posner suggested that the private benefit
doctrine could provide an alternate means of supervising "bad" agreements
between exempt charities and for-profit outsiders:
Suppose that UCC was so irresponsibly managed that it paid
W & H twice as much for fundraising services as W & H
would have been happy to accept .... Then it could be
argued that UCC was in fact being operated to a significant
degree for the private benefit of W & H ....
... [A] violation of [a governing board's duty of care]
which involved the dissipation of the charity's assets might
(we need not decide whether it would-we leave that issue to
the Tax Court in the first instance) support a finding that the

66. E.g., St. David's Health Care Sys., Inc. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 235-37 (5th Cir.
2003). The IRS control analysis in this ruling was largely approved by the courts in these cases,
although the courts seemed to be more willing to consider whether the joint venture arrangement
provided practical control over partnership activities, rather than strict voting control, in
determining exempt status. Redlands Surgical Servs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47, 79-83 (1999),
petitionfor review denied, 242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001). See, e.g., 1 MANCINO, supra note 56, at
§ 19.04[5][b], [c]; HYATT & HPKINS, supranote 65, at § 22.11, 378-90 (discussing Redlands).
67. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 IRB LEXIS 94, at *21.
68. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1999).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1175.
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charity was conferring a private benefit ....
C. The Ancillary PartnershipRuling: Where Did
PrivateBenefit Go?
By 2004, therefore, the private benefit doctrine appeared to be firmly
entrenched as a cornerstone of IRS oversight of exempt charities. The
potential application of private benefit had expanded from the commonlaw rule requiring a broad charitable class to a doctrine that potentially
encompassed any benefit (economic or not) flowing to for-profit entities
or individuals as a result of serving the charitable class. Then a strange
thing happened: In one of the most anticipated exemption rulings of the
new millennium, private benefit analysis disappeared.
Ever since the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 98-15 on whole-hospital
joint ventures, both private commentators and the IRS had recognized the
need for a follow-up ruling on what had become known in the trade as
"ancillary" joint ventures.72 While not legally defined, the phrase
"ancillary joint venture" has come to describe a partnership between an
exempt charity and a for-profit entity involving some significant, but
"small," part of the activities of the exempt charity. 73 In the hospital
context, where the phrase appears to have been coined, ancillary joint
ventures were those that involved some "spin off' of a portion of the
hospital's operations, such as an outpatient surgery facility (in contrast to
the "whole hospital" joint venture, where the hospital contributed all its
assets and operations to the partnership).74 In particular, the practicing bar
had complained that the imposition of the "control" test of Revenue Ruling
98-15 on ancillary joint ventures was unrealistic.75 IRS officials, in turn,
appeared to recognize that ancillary partnerships might need a different
analysis than provided by Revenue Ruling 98-15.76

71. Id. at 1179-80.
72. E.g., J. Christine Harris, PractitionersHope to See Joint Ventures, Section 527 Issues in
2002 EO CPE Text, 33 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 378, 379 (2001).
73. See Mirkay, supra note 2, at 23; HYATT & HOPKINS, supranote 65, at § 22.11, at 378.
I have put the word "small" in quotations because I am not using the word in the sense of a
comparison of revenues or expenditures or other such mathematical tests. Rather, an "ancillary"
joint venture is defined by the fact that the exempt participant still carries on a substantial charitable
program apart from the activities of the joint venture. "Small" in this sense means a qualitative, not
necessarily quantitative, judgment, though in the health care arena, "ancillary" joint ventures do
tend to represent a relatively small portion of the overall revenues and services provided by the
exempt participant.
74. See Mirkay, supra note 2, at 23.
75. See, e.g., J.Christine Harris, EO Reps CallIRS's Stance on Joint Ventures 'Unrealistic,'
40 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 9, 10 (2003); Barbara Yuill, No IRS Private Rulings on Way for
CharitableHospitalJoint Ventures, 10 HEALTH L. REP. 1867 (2001). This latter article quotes T.
J. Sullivan, a prominent practitioner, stating the IRS "'needs to adopt a workable position on
ancillary joint ventures that don't fit' within the paradigms laid out in Rev. Rul. 98-15. Yuill,
supra, at 1867; see also Mirkay, supra note 2, at 52-53.
76. E.g., Fred Stokeld, IRS Branch ChiefClarifies Guidance on Hospitals'Joint Ventures,
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In early 2004, the IRS finally issued Revenue Ruling 2004-51 on
ancillary partnerships.77 Using the fact pattern of an exempt university
partnering with a for-profit firm to provide distance education services
(which the Service noted was an "insubstantial" part of the university's
activities), the ruling held that such partnerships would not endanger
exempt status for the nonprofit participant, even if the exempt partner did
not have control over the venture (in the facts, the university and for-profit
partner shared control fifty-fifty, although in the ruling the IRS noted that
the exempt university retained control over curricular matters).78 The
ruling, however, contained one major surrise: a total lack of any reference
in the analysis section to private benefit. In fact, the entire analysis of the
tax exemption issues is contained in two sentences in the ruling:
The activities M [(the exempt participant)] is treated as
conducting through L [(the joint venture)] are not a
substantial part of M's activities within the meaning of
§ 501 (c)(3) and § 1.501 (c)(3)-1 (c)(1). Therefore, based on all
the facts and circumstances, M's participation in L, taken
alone, will not affect M's continued qualification for
exemption as an organization described in § 501(c)(3).8 °
The disappearance of private benefit analysis from the ancillary
partnership ruling is a curious thing. If private benefit is to be judged using
a balancing test on a transaction-by-transaction basis (as General Counsel
Memorandum 39,862 and other IRS positions set forth above tell us), and
if in the partnership situation impermissible private benefit exists unless
the charitable partner maintains control over the partnership (as the IRS
claims in Revenue Ruling 98-15), then the IRS should have explained in
the ruling why this transaction passed the private benefit test despite the
lack of control by the exempt institution over the partnership. But the IRS
did not do this. Why? The answer appears simple: To have discussed and
dismissed private benefit concerns, either the IRS would have had to admit
that the control test presented in Revenue Ruling 98-15 was too rigid, or
Charity Care,33 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 203,204 (2001) ("Friedlander also sought to allay fears
that any partnership activity by nonprofit hospital systems could jeopardize exemption. Minor
partnership activity will not endanger exempt status, though the activity may be taxed, he said.").
77. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, 2004 IRB LEXIS 201.
78. Id., 2004 IRB LEXIS 201, at *12. The ruling also examined the unrelated business
income tax (UBIT) implications of the arrangement, holding that under the facts of this specific
case, the activities of the venture were "substantially related" to the university's educational
purpose and therefore revenues from the venture were not subject to the UBIT. Id., 2004 IRB
LEXIS 201, at *10, *12.
79. The ruling did cite the "usual suspects" in the "law" section of the ruling, including Treas.
Reg. § 1.501-(c)(3)-1 (d) and the RedlandsSurgicalServices and St. David's cases, but did not refer
to these sources in the analysis section. Id., 2004 IRB LEXIS 201, at *4-7.
80. Id., 2004 IRB LEXIS 201, at *10 (emphasis omitted).
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else that its transaction-by-transaction approach was incorrect (e.g., even
if private benefit existed in the ancillary partnership, it should not
outweigh the fact that most of the university's activities were classically
charitable educational activities aimed at a broad charitable class). Either
possibility would have required the IRS to directly overrule a firmlyentrenched prior position that had won court support (see above), and
doing so obviously presented some distasteful options. So instead, the IRS
adopted the time-honored tradition of ignoring problems you would rather
not confront, leaving the rest of us to speculate on the cosmic meaning of
the ruling and what, if anything, it had to say about the private benefit
doctrine."'
D. Still Alive: Credit Counseling and Down-Payment Assistance
Although the ancillary joint venture ruling raised questions about the
scope and viability of the private benefit doctrine, recent IRS actions make
clear that the doctrine is alive, well, and a continuing major part of IRS
enforcement efforts. An ongoing audit program of tax-exempt credit
counseling organizations started in 2003 has resulted in the revocation of
exemption for forty-one of sixty-three audited organizations so far,82 with
private benefit playing a major substantive role in the rationale for
revocation. 3 A memorandum from the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued
in 2004 advised that "we will need to argue that, even if [credit counseling
agencies] are providing education, the organizations fail the operational
test: they are furthering a substantial nonexempt purpose, and furthermore
they are conferring impermissible private benefits . . . ."84 Later in this
81. Several high-profile practitioners expressed satisfaction with the ruling immediately after
its release. See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, PractitionersPleasedwith Revenue Ruling on Ancillary Joint
Ventures, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 284, 284 (2004). Later articles, however, pointed out several
things the ruling left open, such as whether ownership of less than 50% by the exempt partner
would result in exemption problems, or whether joint ventures that failed the "relatedness" test of
the unrelated business income tax would be judged differently. For example, Michael I. Sanders,
who was quoted in Stokeld's article as being initially favorable to the ruling, was later critical of
its limitations. Id.; see alsoJ. Christine Harris, TaxLaw ProfessorsSay Recent Joint Venture Ruling
Doesn'tBreak GroundIn Housing,47 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 21, 21 (2005); Mirkay, supranote
2, at 58-59. My own view is that the ruling constituted a sub-silentio "relaxation" of the control
requirement-note the stress in the ruling on the fact that the university in question controlled the
parts of the venture dealing with educational policy-and was a signal that, as the court decisions
in Redlands SurgicalServices andSt. David'sseemed to indicate, something short of voting control
over a venture could still meet charitable criteria. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
82. See Fred Stokeld, Everson Announces Credit Counseling Enforcement Initiative, 52
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 250, 250 (2006). The remaining twenty-two cases were still pending as
of June 2006. Id. By the time this Article appears in print, it is possible that all sixty-three
organizations will have lost their exemption.
83. See id.
84. I.R.S. ChiefCouns. Mem. 200,431,023 (July 30,2004) availableat http://www.irs.gov/
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memorandum, the IRS laid out its main private benefit argument: That
many or most modem credit counseling agencies violated the private
benefit doctrine because the agencies' operations directly benefitted the
"back-office service providers" with whom the agencies had contractual
arrangements to promote debt consolidation loans, credit repair services,
buying clubs, down-payment assistance, and even dietary supplements. 5
In essence, the IRS position is that credit counseling organizations are
entering into exclusive deals with back-office service providers through
which the credit counseling organization "offloads" most of the actual
services, while at the same time selling services to its ostensibly charitable
beneficiaries that provide substantial profits to for-profit third parties.
Even more recently, the IRS published Revenue Ruling 2006-27, in
which it analyzed exemption for organizations that provided cash downpayment assistance grants to poor individuals to help purchase housing.86
Situation 2 of this ruling involved an organization that provided this
assistance largely via payments from the home seller (that is, the seller
would make a "donation" to the organization, which in turn would transfer
this amount, less fees, to the buyer as down-payment assistance).87 In this
situation, the IRS concluded that the circular cash flow (from seller to
organization to buyer then back to seller) constituted an impermissible
private benefit to the sellers and real estate brokers involved in the
transactions, despite the fact the organization "also serves an exempt
purpose."8
I. FINDING PRIVATE BENEFIT

A. Policy Aspects: What Evil Does Private Benefit Prevent?
The morphing of private benefit from a doctrine focused on the size of
the charitable class to one that encompasses virtually any transaction
between an exempt charity and non-exempt entities or individuals and the
conspicuous absence of the doctrine from Revenue Ruling 2004-51,
present strong evidence that something is amiss with the definition of
private benefit. Indeed, the problem is that the doctrine currently has no
theoretical grounding to set its outer boundaries. While the bounds of
private inurement have been well defined as a siphoning off of charitable
assets to an insider, private benefit seems to encompass all sorts of
economic transactions (or even, as with American CampaignAcademy, no
pub/irs-wd/0431023.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-21 I.R.B. 915, 2006 IRB LEXIS 207.
87. Id., 2006 IRB LEXIS 207, at *3-4.
88. Id., 2006 IRB LEXIS 207, at *19.
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economic transaction at all) with insiders or outsiders (even when, as the
IRS concluded in Revenue Ruling 2006-27, the organization "also serves
an exempt purpose")89 without any clear guidance as to why individual
transactions create these problems. So perhaps we should begin the
journey of finding private benefit by returning to the potential policy
reasons for the doctrine and its relationship to private inurement and the
general "primary purpose" test for exemption-in other words, we should
begin by asking what evil the doctrine is designed to avoid.
Charitable organizations must primarily pursue a charitable purpose in
order to be eligible for exemption.9 ° As a policy matter, that is why we
grant exemption in the first place: to encourage/enable these organizations
to pursue purposes that under one theory or another we believe are
deserving of special tax treatment.9 ' This requirement of primarily
pursuing a charitable purpose is at the heart of the Treasury Regulation's
"operational" test for exemption.92
As noted above, historically the private benefit concept has been used
to identify whether a charity was actually engaged in a charitable purpose
at all-that is, whether the charity was serving a broad charitable class.9 3
We could simply return private benefit to this historical role, but before we
do so, we should explore whether there is some reason to broaden the
definition of private benefit beyond that historical one, as the IRS has done
over the past thirty years.
One possibility for an expanded definition relates to the primary
purpose requirement. Under this view, the "evil" identified by an expanded
view of private benefit is that a charity has become more concerned with
serving private interests than in delivering charitable services-in essence,
private benefit is simply a specialized way of saying that a charity no
longer is primarilypursuing a charitable purpose, but instead has become
89. Id., 2006 IRB LEXIS 207, at *19.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2006). Though the statute states that an entity is exempt
only if it is organized and operated "exclusively" for charitable purposes, this statutory directive
has long been interpreted as requiring the organization to operate "primarily" for charitable
purposes. See, e.g., New Dynamics Found. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 782, 799 (Fed. Cl. 2006)
("'Exclusively' in this statutory context is a term of art and does not mean 'solely.' Rather, an
organization is 'operated exclusively' for exempt purposes if it engages in primarily exempt
activities.") (citation omitted).
91. Unlike perhaps all the rest of tax law, tax exemption has no clearly-defined underlying
theory. Commentators have variously explained exemption as a government subsidy or government
non-interference for organizations that broadly benefit the community, that relieve the government
of the necessity of providing certain services directly, that produce goods/services not produced by
the private market, or that promote the pluralistic ideal in our society. For an overview, see JOHN
D. COLOMBO AND MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 19-96 (1995); JAMES J.
FISHMAN AND STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFTr ORGANIZATIONS 327-48 (3d ed. 2006).
92. For a general discussion of the operational test, see HOPKINS, supra note 17, at § 4.5.
93. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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a "'for-profit in disguise."' 9 4 The difference between this view and the
historical definition of private benefit is that under this view, an
organization might still be serving a large enough charitable class, but that
doing so has become secondary to benefitting entities or individuals
outside the charitable class. Think, for example, about a nominally
nonprofit hospital whose board is controlled by a small group of doctors
who have the only admitting privileges to the hospital. In this case, one
might argue that the hospital is still providing health care for a broad
enough charitable class, but the overriding purpose of the hospital is to
benefit the controlling doctors by providing them with a closed,
preferential system in which to practice medicine-that is, in this case,
serving the charitable class has become secondary to serving the private
interests of the doctors. 95
There is certainly language in IRS rulings and court cases that would
suggest this is the proper interpretation of private benefit. For example, in
the key rulings set forth above in which the IRS has applied private benefit
analysis, it routinely cites the operational test for exemption; 96 even the
court in American CampaignAcademy concluded that the excess of private
benefit meant that the organization was no longer primarily operated for
charitable purposes. 97
This suggestion, however, does not really help focus a definition for a
separate concept of private benefit. If private benefit is nothing more than
saying that an organization is no longer primarily pursuing a charitable
purpose, then it does not offer much beyond the primary purpose test. It
does not answer the question, for example, why we should be particularly
concerned about charities entering into joint-venture transactions with forprofit organizations, an area which the history recounted above indicates
has been the primary breeding ground for the IRS's expanded
interpretation of private benefit. Nor does it address Judge Posner's
suggestion in United Cancer Council that "bad deals" could result in
private benefit even if those bad deals were earnestly pursued in order to
serve the charitable class, as was undoubtedly true in that case. 98
The actual scope of the private benefit doctrine as implemented,
moreover, indicates that the IRS really does not see private benefit as
94. Economist Burton A. Weisbrod is the originator of this phrase. Burton A. Weisbrod, The
Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NoNPROFIT SECTOR 11 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
95. This example is Hospital B from Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 1969 IRB LEXIS
176, at *3-4.
96. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2006-27,2006-21 I.R.B. 915,2006 IRB LEXIS 207, at *5-10 (citing
the operational test of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)); Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998
IRB LEXIS 94, at *8-9 (same).
97. Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. 1053, 1079 (1989).
98. United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm 'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999).
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simply a substitute for the primary purpose rule. If we are to believe the
IRS's transactional approach, then private benefit (like private inurement)
can cause a loss of exemption if a single transaction involves private
benefit, even when the overall operations of a particular organization are
more charitable than not (i.e., primarily charitable). I would suggest that
there is little doubt that the hospitals engaged in the revenue-stream joint
ventures described above in General Counsel Memorandum 39,862 were
still primarily centered on a mission of providing health services to the
general population, a purpose that the IRS recognized as charitable in
Revenue Ruling 69-545.99 Moreover, in its private benefit rulings, the IRS
likes to stress the quotation from the old Better Business Bureau case that
"the presence of a single [non-exempt] purpose, if substantial in nature,
will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of
truly [exempt] purposes."' ° This quote supports the conclusion that
private benefit, like private inurement, is a problem even when charitable
purposes might globally outweigh a private benefit transaction. Despite the
final conclusion of the court in American CampaignAcademy, moreover,
the crux of the opinion was that the organization in question failed
exemption because of secondary benefits, not because it failed to provide
primarycharitable services to a charitable class."l ' So it seems that, despite
the citations to the primary purpose rule in various rulings, the IRS does
not really treat private benefit as simply shorthand for the primary purpose
test, but rather as a separate limitation on an organization that arguably in
fact has a primary charitable purpose. In any event, if private benefit is to
be useful as a separate concept, it must be more than just a shorter way of
saying that the charity no longer has a primary charitable purpose.
A second set of possible evils relates specifically to economic
transactions. As noted above, the private inurement limitation and I.R.C.
§ 4958 identify as one evil the situation in which a charity diverts assets
for less than fair market value to for-profit interests.'0 2 But private
inurement/4958 covers only situations in which the diversion involves
insiders (as broadly defined by § 4958), and even then covers only
situations in which the exchange is not at fair market value (that is, the
charity receives less economically than it gives up).0 3 One immediate
question that arises, therefore, is whether one can conceive of such
diversion transactions that do not involve insiders or whether there might
be situations in which even transactions that occur at fair market value are

99.
100.
see, e.g.,
101.
102.
103.

Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 1969 IRB LEXIS 176, at *5.
Better Bus. Bureau ofWashington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279,283 (1945);
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 IRB LEXIS 94, at *9 (citing this language).
See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
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nevertheless troublesome. If so, perhaps we need the private benefit
doctrine to address these situations. This area holds more promise in
identifying a separate private benefit doctrine, particularly since most of
the cases in which private benefit is invoked involve economic benefits
from contractual relationships with for-profits (joint ventures, service
contracts and the like). It also offers some potential for actually defining
a separate private benefit concept that is not already covered by other
exemption rules.
On the one hand, it is hard to imagine a situation in which a charity
intentionally diverts assets at less than market value to an outsider. If a
charity enters into an economic transaction with someone who has no
influence over the charity, there is simply no reason to believe that the
charity would intentionally hand assets over to that person for less than full
value. In fact, this principle of arm's-length transactions being presumed
10 4
to be fair-market-value exchanges is a core principle of all of tax law,
born from general observations of human behavior and the administrative
impossibility of policing every transaction. No one wants to be a "chump"
taken advantage of by the other side. Ergo, no one is going to knowingly
part with one's assets for insufficient value unless there is some
relationship between the parties that signals the transaction is not at arm'slength. Accordingly, the notion that one would intentionally overpay or
undercharge for services outside a context in which the recipient of the
economic benefit has some kind of insider connection does not comport
with either basic assumptions of our tax system nor with normal human
economic behavior.
What is possible, however, is that the managers of a charity negligently
"divert" assets to for-profit interests even in arm's-length transactions.
This is the possibility recognized by Judge Posner at the end of his opinion
in the United Cancer Council case when he opined that irresponsible
management could result in private benefit.'°5 That is, because of a lack of
information or a lack of rigor in analyzing the benefits and costs of
particular transactions, charities may engage in transactions with outsiders
that either are economically inefficient or result in them paying too much
for what they get or getting too little for what they give up--what I will
call a failure to conserve assets for the benefit of the charitable class. Such

104. The classic definition of "fair market value" for tax purposes is the price on which a
willing buyer and willing seller, each in possession of the relevant facts, agree. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2005); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965); Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992); see, e.g., Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United
States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (stating that fair market value of property received in
exchange can be proven by reference to fair market value of property given up, since in an arm'slength exchange the two values "are either equal in fact, or are presumed to be equal").
105. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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a failure to conserve is bothersome, because the charity is wasting assets
that should otherwise be used for charitable services-in effect, the charity
is shifting some of the economic value from the various tax benefits we
confer on exempt organizations (exemption, charitable contributions
deduction, etc.) away from charitable services.
I believe this failure to conserve is most likely to arise in two separate
circumstances outlined below, neither of which is specifically addressed
by either the primary purpose rule or the private inurement/4958 regime.
Suppose, for example, that we imagine a nonprofit hospital that has a
community board and an open staff policy, treats Medicare and Medicaid
patients, and provides free emergency treatment to the poor. These are the
characteristics the IRS set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-545 for charitable
exemption for a hospital. °6 But it so happens that this particular hospital
conducts all its services via contract with for-profit entities. The
emergency room is managed by Emergency Doctors, Inc.; patient records
and billing are farmed out to Hospital Records Corp.; nursing services are
provided by Nurses Clinic, Inc.; diagnostic and lab services are likewise
in the hands of for-profit providers, and so forth.0 7 All the contracts with
these providers are negotiated at arm's length at fair market value, but of
course the negotiated price includes a profit margin for each for-profit
entity providing services to the hospital and its patients.
Although this hospital appears to meet all the requirements of
charitable exemption set forth in Revenue Ruling 69-545,1°8 the
hypothetical raises a nagging question about why the hospital has chosen
to provide all its services via contracts with for-profit firms. In essence, the
question here is why we should permit exemption to fund the profit margin
necessarily paid to the for-profit contractors as opposed to a direct service
model where presumably that profit margin would be "saved" by the
nonprofit and used instead to provide expanded services to the charitable
class. In short, the evil here is not a conscious diversion of charitable
assets, but rather a potential failure to conserve charitable assets for the
benefit of the charitable class by entering into transactions that cause an
unnecessary outflow of assets to non-charitable interests.
Similarly, one might imagine situations in which an exempt charity
106. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 1969 IRB LEXIS 176, at *1-2, *7; see also
Colombo, supra note 31, at 480.
107. My hypothetical may not be far from the truth, at least if one believes the report of the
Champaign County Board of Review recommending that the Illinois Department of Revenue
revoke tax exemption for Carle Hospital in Urbana, Illinois. CHAMPAIGN COUNTY BOARD
OF REVIEW, NOTES ON EXEMPT APPLICATIONS 11-12, http://www.co.champaign.il.us/ BOR/
CARLE2004.pdf. In this report, the Board of Review recommended that the Illinois Department
of Revenue revoke property tax exemption from Carle Hospital based in part on its extensive
contracts with for-profit groups to provide services to hospital patients. Id. at 10-11.
108. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 1969 IRB LEXIS 176, at *1-3, *7.
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negligently fails to fully exploit the value of rights it has assigned to an
unrelated for-profit entity. Suppose, for example, that an exempt nonprofit
tissue bank enters into a long-term exclusive agreement to provide tissue
to a single unrelated for-profit tissue processor.'0 9 The arrangement is at
arm's length and therefore under general tax law presumptions, we would
normally assume that it is at "fair market value." But the tissue bank has
given up the right to exploit changes in the market by engaging in a longterm exclusivity agreement. It is possible in this case that the nonprofit is
conferring a competitive advantage on the for-profit processor (in the form
of a stable supply of tissue at a fixed price) and in the process failed to
extract an above-market price (supra-normal profit) for the tissue justified
by this competitive advantage. This situation, therefore, might also present
a case in which the charity has failed to conserve charitable assets by
giving up a valuable right (the right to freely exploit the future market for
its goods) without full compensation. One might even imagine cases in
which, because of such long-term "cozy" relationships, the nonprofit
involved fails to engage in the hard bargaining with its long-term business
associate that would result in the proper capture of these supra-normal
profits.
Neither of these cases is adequately addressed by current doctrine. Both
hypotheticals involve organizations that are routinely recognized as
exempt charities. Neither appears to be subject to the inurement/4958
prohibitions: My hypothetical hospital is engaged in fair-market-value
exchanges, which would not be subject to the private inurement/4958
regime, while my tissue processing hypo involves a contract with an
outsider, and hence also is not subject to the inurement/4958 analysis. Yet
both situations involve cases in which arguably a charity may not be
appropriately conserving charitable assets for its charitable class.
The main problem with these observations at this stage, however, is
109. This example was inspired by the analysis in Robert A. Katz, The Re-Gift Of Life: Can
Charity Law Prevent For-ProfitFirms From Exploiting Donated Tissue And Nonprofit Tissue
Banks?, 55 DEPAULL. REV. 943,998-1004 (2006) [hereinafter Katz, TheRe-GiftofLife]. Professor
Katz suggests that under current law, the private benefit doctrine could be read to capture
transactions in which directors of a nonprofit exempt tissue bank transfer tissue to a for-profit
processor, because under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) the exempt tissue bank is not
permitted to capture the full value of the tissue transferred to a for-profit processor. Id. Ergo, the
exempt tissue bank is benefitting the private interests of the for-profit processors, and arguably is
doing so in a substantial way. Under my formulation, presumably this would no longer be a risk,
since the directors of the charity would not be negligently failing to capture economic value, but
rather simply following the law. See id. at 1003-04 (under Judge Posner's formulation, no private
benefit would occur as a result of following NOTA); see also Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python:
How the CharitableResponse to September 11 Overwhelmed the Law of DisasterRelief 36 IND.
L. REv. 251,264-65 (2003) [hereinafter Katz, A Pigin a Python] (noting that under Judge Posner's
formulation of private benefit in the United Cancer Council case, private benefit occurs in a case
in which the directors violate their duty of care and negligently waste nonprofit assets).
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that they are potentially overbroad in two ways. First, exempt charities
engage daily in private benefit transactions simply as a result of operating.
They pay the for-profit telephone company and the for-profit electrical and
gas utilities for service, send packages via for-profit UPS and Fed-Ex, hire
for-profitjanitorial services, etc., all of which confer economic benefits on
for-profit entities and involve payment of a profit margin to that entity, and
none of which disturbs us in the least. In some cases, the charity may enter
into long-term exclusive dealings with these providers as well. So why
shouldn't these transactions result in private benefit scrutiny? Or should
they?
Perhaps the answer here lies in a sort of unstated presumption analysis.
That is, we could say that exemption law presumes that these routine
services do not involve a failure to conserve charitable assets because they
could not be performed by the charitable entity itself more efficiently. We
instinctively assume, probably correctly in virtually all these cases, that
paying an electric utility for power is cheaper (or at least no more
expensive) for a charity than trying to generate its own power even though
the payment to the utility includes a profit margin for the utility. Utilities,
we know, employ economies of scale that likely would be impossible for
a single business to replicate. Charities generally have no expertise in
power generation and no invested capital base for doing that. We might
logically presume, therefore, that common, routine services provided by
for-profit entities to charities have similar economies that would be
difficult or impossible for a charity to replicate, and therefore arm's-length
contracts for such services should not generally raise issues about failing
to conserve charitable assets.
But when it comes to what I will call "core services" of the exempt
organization (e.g., services that form the core primary charitable purpose,
such as a hospital providing medical services to its patients, as opposed to
buying electrical power to heat its building, or a tissue bank supplying
tissue to a for-profit processor for the ultimate purpose of bettering the
health of the community), the above presumption no longer seems
reasonable. If the major purpose of a hospital is to provide health services
to patients, we would expect the hospital itself to be as efficient in
delivering those services as an outside provider. It is the hospital, after all,
not the outside provider, that has the invested capital base and presumably
some expertise in providing health services. Similarly, if a tissue bank
enters into an exclusive contract to supply tissue to a single processor, we
might logically ask why (if it were legal to do so'10) the tissue bank is not
"shopping the market" for its product in order to maximize revenue. Since

110. Current law in the form of the National Organ Transplant Act limits the ability of tissue
banks to capture these revenues. See Katz, The Re-Gift of Life, supra note 109, at 952-55.
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the tissue bank is intimately involved in the tissue market, we would
expect them to have the relevant information necessary to fully exploit
their "product" and use this information to their advantage. Thus, unlike
the case with contracts for routine services, at least we should notpresume
that hiring a for-profit company to provide services to the hospital's
patients or entering into an exclusive arrangement with a for-profit tissue
provider is more efficient or "better" in some way than hiring nurses
directly or dealing with several processors (or non-profit processors). In
fact, perhaps an opposite presumption is justified in these cases: That is,
if core services are "outsourced" to for-profit enterprises or exclusive deals
involving core services are entered into that may confer competitive
advantages on a for-profit entity, we might presume that a charity is failing
to conserve charitable assets.
This counter-presumption, however, raises the second overbreadth
possibility. Certainly we could imagine situations in which for one reason
or another the charity is justified in outsourcing core services or is justified
in conferring an economic advantage on a for-profit as part of a business
relationship. For example, perhaps the governing board of my hypothetical
hospital made a detailed study of the costs of providing services directly
versus outsourcing them, and concluded that outsourcing would actually
save money while keeping quality constant. Or my hypothetical tissue
bank might have done a study of the tissue market and reasonably believed
that the price negotiated for its exclusive arrangement was preferable to
the risk of a downward price movement in the tissue market over the term
of the exclusive agreement. If the board of either of my hypothetical
charities made such a considered judgment, then presumably there is no
failure to conserve charitable assets (or at least tax-exemption law should
not second-guess such a considered judgment under the circumstances).
B. Summary: The Resulting "Failure-to-Conserve" Test
We can now gather the above rationale to fashion a doctrinal test for
private benefit. If we view the evil that the private benefit doctrine tries to
prevent as a negligent failure to conserve charitable assets, then the
concept seems worthwhile because it operates in an area that current
doctrine fails to capture. As noted above, neither the primary purpose
analysis nor the inurement/4958 regime appears to cover "what's wrong"
with my hypothetical scenarios; ergo a separate concept that prohibits this
potential evil seems appropriate.
This "failure to conserve" analysis could in theory apply to any
transaction in which a charity contracts for service with a for-profit entity
(since all such transactions involve the payment of a profit margin to the
for-profit), but common sense tells us that in routine transactions for
incidental services, such contracts are in fact justified on efficiency
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/3
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grounds. As a matter of administrability of the tax laws, then, we should
not apply private benefit analysis to such transactions. Instead, private
benefit analysis should come into play primarily when a charity contracts
with a for-profit entity for core services-that is, in situations in which an
exempt entity outsources the delivery of core services to its charitable
class, or situations in which the exempt entity enters into an economic
arrangement with a for-profit involving core services and the arrangement
arguably grants a competitive advantage to the for-profit. In these cases,
where we legitimately can be suspicious of the economic efficiency of
outsourcing such services or entering into competitive advantage
arrangements, the concept of failing to conserve charitable assets is most
in play.
Of course, the charity should be given the chance to rebut this
suspicion by showing that the economic arrangements with outsiders for
these core services are in fact a more efficient or "better" way to deliver
services to the charitable class. Accordingly, if the charity can make a
convincing case that it fully considered the options and reached a
reasonable conclusion that its contractual arrangements were a better way
to serve its charitable purpose, then the arrangements should be permitted
to stand. In other words, in circumstances where we might legitimately
view a particular economic transaction with suspicion, the charity should
be required to provide a reasonable justification for why the transaction is
in the best interests of serving the charitable class.
The next question, then, is what behavior should be sufficient to meet
this "reasonablejustification" standard. One possibility would be to import
the state-law duty of care into this definition, and simply tie the federal
concept of private benefit to the state charity law concept of duty of
care-that is, the federal tax inquiry would be whether the transaction in
question had violated state-law standards for the duty of care. Under this
hypothesis, the reasonable justification would simply be a successful
defense that the board had not violated this duty. However, for reasons of
consistency across jurisdictions and the fact that the state-law duty of care
might not require the sort of due diligence I conceive for this issue,'

111. The duty of care, of course, covers all sorts of board-level decisions, and the state law
surrounding the standards for the duty of care is still somewhat in flux. Marion Fremont-Smith
reports that as of the beginning of 2003, forty-three states had codified a standard for the duty of
care, and over half of those states had adopted the definitions in the ABA's Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) promulgated in 1987. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH,
GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS AND REGULATION 207
(2004). The American Law Institute also is currently engaged in a project on nonprofit law that may
further refine the duty of care at the state level. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS § 315 (Council Draft No. 4, 2006). Obviously, federal tax law needs a single
standard of behavior since the federal tax law is applicable to organizations across all state
jurisdictions; moreover, I contemplate that because of what I view as an "enhanced" risk that
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federal tax law should define its own version of reasonable justification for
this purpose. In general terms, one could envision using the same sort of
approach used in the salary safe-harbor provision of the regulations under
§ 4958, requiring a board to use comparable salary data and to document
the basis for its decision.' 12 Applying this approach to the failure to
conserve test, the reasonable justification would need to be based upon
relevant comparable data and practices by similar exempt charities, and the
organization would have to document a rationale for why it believed the
transaction "improved" services to the charitable class. In my hospital
hypothetical, for example, the relevant data likely would consist of a
comparison of the costs and quality of providing services internally versus
outsourcing such services. My hypothetical tissue bank might document
the volatility in the tissue market that would justify a long-term
arrangement at a stable price, or show that the price in the long-term deal
was higher than that provided by the "spot market" over some average
period to illustrate that the exempt organization had fully considered the
value of the economic advantage it was granting to the for-profit
processor.
C. Matching the "Failure-to-Conserve" Rationale to
Existing Doctrine
Now that I have outlined the failure-to-conserve rationale, the paradigm
situations in which it might occur, and the resulting doctrinal test for
private benefit in these circumstances, the next logical questions are how
would the proposed affect existing precedent on the application of the
charities are failing to conserve assets in the paradigm transactions I consider above, we might well
demand somewhat more diligence for directors than would be required by the "ordinarily prudent
person" standard of the RMNCA.
112. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a) (2006). Exempt charities that follow the safe-harbor provision
receive a benefit in that the burden of proof for noncompliance shifts to the IRS. There has been
some suggestion that this safe harbor may be too lenient. In 2005, for example, the Joint Committee
on Taxation proposed deleting the safe-harbor and substituting a "due diligence" standard that
would keep the burden of proof on the charity to explain how it approved a salary in certain
circumstances. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAx COMPLiANCE AND REFORM
TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-02-05, at 254-69 (2005). I would not apply the burden-shifting provision
of Treas. Reg. § 53.4958 to my analysis, however, because I view the kinds of paradigm
transactions I have identified ("outsourcing" core services or using core services as the basis for
conferring a competitive advantage on a for-profit) as inherently suspect. Ergo, the charity should
retain the burden of proving that these transactions are in the best interests of the charitable class.
Instead, I would view a charity's reliance on data and written justification as a sort of prima facie
case, which the IRS could rebut by showing contrary evidence indicating that the charity's reliance
on the data or its justification were manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances. I use
"manifestly" here because hindsight is always 20/20, and we should be careful to give the
governing board of a charity the benefit of the doubt concerning the reasonableness of their
conclusions when we are judging them at some later point than when the decision was made.
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private benefit doctrine, and how might it apply to various "troublesome"
scenarios in which the IRS has used private benefit as a policing tool.
1. "Incidental" Private Benefit and the Transactional Approach
Perhaps the first thing to note is that with its focus on core services, the
failure-to-conserve rationale fits well with the IRS's declaration in General
Counsel Memorandum 39,598 that incidental private benefit is not a
concern."13 Focusing on core services would exempt from private benefit
analysis all truly routine, incidental transactions required by daily
operations under the theory that these transactions present virtually no
possibility of a failure to conserve assets. Doing this, moreover, is
probably an administrative necessity anyway, since this avoids saddling
charities and the IRS with the need to review and justify literally thousands
of common business transactions. On the other hand, all transactions
involving core services (e.g., a hospital hiring a for-profit doctors group
to cover emergency room medical services, a nonprofit organization doing
a low-income housing deal via a partnership with for-profit partners)
would be subject to the analysis presented above and would require the
charity to have a reasonable justification for the transaction--or in other
words, no transaction dealing with core services would be considered
incidental for this purpose (for example, as I discuss below, ancillary joint
ventures would not be exempt from this analysis if the joint venture
involved core services).
But what of the IRS's "transactional" approach to private benefit (e.g.,
the assertion that a single private benefit transaction will endanger exempt
status)? As much as I have previously criticized the transactional
approach, if private benefit is limited as I have outlined in this article, then
it makes some sense to use a transactional analysis here, just as we have
used it for years in the private inurement realm. That is, if a charity really
is guilty of negligently "wasting" charitable assets (after having given the
charity "fair warning" that these core services transactions will be
specially scrutinized and allowing them to build their justification case),
then there is a reason to consider revocation of exemption. Whatever your
theoretical bent in justifying exemption, a charity that is not appropriately
conserving its assets for use on the charitable class should not be given
preferential tax treatment. As a practical matter, moreover, the IRS can
enter into closing agreements to avoid revocation in appropriate cases, just
as it did for private inurement transactions prior to the adoption of I.R.C.
§ 4958.114

113. See supranotes 41-43 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Bernadette M. Broccolo & Michael W. Peregrine, Bad Doctor Deals Place
HospitalsAt New Risk: PartI-The HermannHospitalClosingAgreement, 10 EXEMPT ORG. TAX
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2. Joint Ventures (Particularly in Health Care and
Low-income Housing)
The use of private benefit as a tool to police transactions involving core
services necessarily requires me to revise my past position that joint
venture transactions should be subjected only to primary
purpose/commerciality/unrelated business income analysis.' 15 That
analytical paradigm should still be the first step in analyzing joint-venture
transactions, but if the exempt venturer survives this initial stage and the
venture involves core services, I would bring the failure-to-conserve
analysis into play as a second analytical step. As indicated below, as a
practical matter, my analysis would reach the same end results as the IRS
has reached in its recent rulings (though perhaps not the same result as in
some older rulings), and would also provide a coherent analysis for private
benefit that would be applicable across all joint ventures, ancillary or not.
Let's start with the whole-hospital joint venture as set forth in Revenue
Ruling 98-15.116 1begin the analysis of these transactions with the primary
purpose/commerciality doctrine, which asks whether the exempt venturer
is still engaged primarily in a charitable activity." 7 In the case of a wholehospital joint venture, this question usually is answered by asking whether
the joint venture itself is a charitable activity." 18 If the exempt venturer in
these cases has no continuing charitable program (other than being a
partner in the hospital venture), and the joint venture itself is not
charitable, the analysis is over, because the exempt entity is primarily
engaged in an unrelated commercial activity." 9 Thus, in these cases,
private benefit never becomes an issue at all. Analytically, this approach
is radically different than the fixation on control and private benefit that
pervades Revenue Ruling 98-15, although the ultimate result would be the
same (i.e., no exemption for the nonprofit venturer). 20

REV. 1341 (1994) (discussing IRS closing agreement with Hermann Hospital involving private
inurement and private benefit issues).
115. John D. Colombo, A Frameworkfor Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects of Joint
Ventures, 34 ExEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 187, 189 (2001). See Mirkay, supra note 2, at 60-65. If the
IRS will adopt the approach in this article to private benefit doctrine, I promise to walk down
Pennsylvania Avenue in sackcloth and ashes as a sign of my repentance.
116. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 IRB LEXIS 94, at *1.
117. Colombo, supranote 115, at 189.
118. Id. at 189-90.
119. The venturer is deemed to be engaged in the underlying activity ofthe joint venture. Rev.
Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 1998 IRB LEXIS 94, at *16-17. Hence if the venture itself is not a
charitable activity, the venturer should be viewed as simply conducting a for-profit business. If the
venturer has no other substantial charitable activity, it fails the primary purpose test. Colombo,
supra note 115, at 190.
120. See Colombo, supra note 115, at 191-93. As I have observed in the past, the IRS's

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss5/3

30

IN SEARCH
OF PRIVATE
BENEFITBenefit
Colombo:
In Search
of Private

Suppose, however, that we move to the case of an exempt organization
whose charitable purpose is to provide low-income housing. This exempt
organization acts as the general partner of limited partnerships with forprofit investors who essentially receive nothing in return except an
allocation of the low-income housing tax credit provided by § 42 of the
Code. 12 1 Currently, this area is a complete mess. The IRS appears
schizophrenic about permitting nonprofit organizations to engage in lowincome housing partnerships, at once recognizing the charitable purpose
of such arrangements and at the same time invoking private benefit
analysis (and the control test) as a limitation on such arrangements that
essentially prohibit exempt partners
from structuring the partnership in
22
ways demanded by the market.1
Under my analysis, one still begins with the primary purpose issue. In
this case, however, one might conclude that the venture itself (providing
low-income housing) is a charitable activity by virtue of the fact that the
venture itself is engaged in relief of the poor. 23 But even if that is true,
because the nonprofit organization has entered into a contract (the
partnership agreement) with for-profit entities (the investors in the
partnership) to provide core services (create low-income housing), we
would invoke the private benefit analysis and ask the nonprofit to provide

fixation on control in these cases is misplaced; control should be a factor in determining whether
the joint venture itself is charitable, but the role of control ends there. Once we have determined
whether the joint venture is charitable, the analysis shifts to a "primary purpose"IUBIT analysis.
Id. at 191-92.
121. See I.R.C. § 42 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Jerry 0. Allen & Alan D. Duffy, Solving the Low-Income Tax Credit Housing
PartnershipDilemma, 49 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 319, 319-20, 323 (2005); J. Christine Harris,
Tax-Exemption AndLow-Income Housing Ventures: IrreconcilableDifferences?,47 EXEMPTORG.
TAX REV. 329, 331 (2005); Harris, supra note 81, at 21; Michael I. Sanders & Celia A. Roady, EO
PractitionersSuggest Way To Expedite Exemptions ForLow-Income Housing Orgs., 37 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 127, 127-28 (2002). In late April 2006, the IRS released additional guidance for
charitable organizations engaging in low-income housing partnerships that sought to ameliorate
some of these criticisms and seems to support the argument in the text below that such partnerships
are usually the best, if not only, vehicle for pursuing the financing necessary to bring low-income
housing projects to fruition. See, e.g., Michael I. Sanders & Jerome A. Breed, IRS Issues Guidance
forNonprofitOrganizationsInvolved in Low-Income Housing,52 ExEMPTORG.TAXREV. 263,263
(2006); Memorandum from Joseph Urban, Acting Director, EO Rulings and Agreements, Internal
Revenue Service to Manager, EO Determinations (Apr. 25,2006), availableat http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-tege/urbanmemo42406.pdf.
123. The IRS has provided guidelines in Rev. Proc. 96-32 for determining when a low-income
housing project should be considered a charitable activity. Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717, 1996
IRB LEXIS 152, at * 1-7. If the partnership adheres to these guidelines, then one might conclude
that the partnership activity itself is a charitable activity, much as one might conclude that a
hospital operated by an exempt/for-profit partnership would be a charitable activity if the hospital
met all of the requirements of Revenue Ruling 69-545, as re-interpreted by the Tenth Circuit in IHC
Health Plans v. Commissioner, 325 F.3d 1188, 1195-98 (10th Cir. 2003).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

31

FLORIDA
Florida Law Review,
Vol.LAWREVIEW
58, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 3

[Vol. 58

reasonable justification for its transaction. This should not be hard to do.
If the transaction is properly structured as an arm's-length deal with the
investors, the reasonable justification will most likely be that the
partnership is the most economically efficient vehicle for the nonprofit to
execute its charitable purpose, since other financing will either be
unavailable or more expensive because of the risk inherent in low-income
housing.' 24 In other words, there is no way for the exempt organization to
better conserve charitable assets than by using the partnership financing
vehicle to accomplish its exempt purpose. On the other hand, if the exempt
venturer "gives away the store" in the partnership agreement by, for
example, bearing a disproportionate amount of the economic risk in the
venture, then one might legitimately invoke the private benefit limitation
for this failure to conserve charitable assets.
When it comes to ancillary joint ventures, things would get modestly
more complicated than they may be today. If, in fact, the ancillary joint
venture ruling is an acknowledgment by the IRS that no private benefit
issues are raised in economic transactions that involve "insubstantial"
services, then the proposed failure-to-conserve analysis might actually
complicate life for exempt entities. The reason for this is that many
ancillary partnership transactions involve core services. Certainly a
hospital that opens an outpatient surgery center in a joint venture with
doctors is providing core services (e.g., health services to patients) through
an economic arrangement with for-profit partners. Moreover, transactions
such as the "revenue stream" partnerships involved in General Counsel
Memorandum 39,862 are exactly the ones that should raise some
eyebrows, because the charity (the hospital) is giving up a future revenue
stream (a significant charitable asset) in a transaction with for-profit
investors. 125 Accordingly, it seems appropriate to require the charity in
these cases to justify the transaction on the basis that it permits an
expansion, improvement or (in appropriate circumstances) the
maintenance of services to the charitable class.
In most of these cases, however, I would expect that the exempt
organization would have little trouble meeting the reasonable justification
requirement. Ancillary partnerships almost always have the purpose of
either keeping current services intact or expanding services to the
charitable class, and almost universally are undertaken in order to
accomplish those goals with minimal financial risk to the charitable entity.
Hospitals, for example, undertake ancillary partnerships with doctors in
order to insure that the facilities are fully utilized and that the doctors have

124. See Allen & Duffy, supranote 122, at 321 ("Equity financing is an important component
of the financing package.").
125. For a discussion of this memorandum, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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a direct financial stake in the success of the services.'2 6 The ancillary
partnership ruling (Revenue Ruling 2004-51) itself involved a situation in
which a university proposed to expand services to students via a distancelearning joint venture.' 27 It is highly unlikely, therefore, that these
transactions generally suffer from a failure to conserve charitable assets (in
fact, just the opposite is true).
In one aspect, moreover, the failure-to-conserve analysis would be
more generous than past IRS precedents: It would overturn the IRS's
position in General Counsel Memorandum 39,862 that entering into
transactions to improve revenues or to retain relationships with doctors
violates the private benefit doctrine.' 28 If, in fact, an exempt hospital can
justify a revenue stream joint venture as a means of improving facility
utilization (and hence improving the bottom line of the hospital and thus
conserving more assets for use on the charitable class) or as a necessary
method of keeping physician affiliations (without which the hospital
would fail economically, leaving no assets available for use for the
charitable class), then I see no reason not to let these arrangements
continue.
To summarize, I would apply the failure-to-conserve analysis equally
across all types of joint ventures, be they whole or ancillary. While this
approach would impose somewhat more scrutiny on ancillary partnerships
than was undertaken in Revenue Ruling 2004-51 (at least in cases where
the ancillary partnership involves core services), the advantage would be
that the analysis of private benefit issues would be consistent across all
joint venture transactions, thus avoiding the need to classify them into
ancillary or non-ancillary categories, and hence giving the IRS an escape
from the unpleasant comer it may have found itself painted into with the
current private benefit analysis. Instead, the only question one would ask
from a private benefit standpoint with respect to joint ventures is whether
the venture involves core services. At the same time, charities would
benefit from a somewhat broader view of the appropriate justifications for
these transactions,' 29 giving them more flexibility to arrange their
economic affairs in a way that truly preserves the maximum assets for
serving charitable beneficiaries.

126. See I MANciNO, supra note 56, at § 19.04.
127. Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, 2004IRB LEXIS 201, at *1-2; see supra notes 7981 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
129. That is, hospitals could do these transactions solely to increase utilization rates or
improve the hospital's revenues, a rationale that the IRS rejected as insufficient in General Counsel
Memorandum 39,862.
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3. Credit Counseling and Down-Payment Assistance
The most recent examples of the IRS's use of the private benefit
doctrine in dealing with exempt credit counseling and down-payment
assistance organizations appear to fit my analytical model. In the credit
counseling cases, my implementation of private benefit almost certainly
would reach the same results that the IRS has reached. The credit
counseling agencies are a classic case of outsourcing core (and not-socore) services to for-profit affiliates, who then profit from the fees paid to
them by the agency or directly by the agency's charitable beneficiaries. 3 0
This profit flow is similar to my original hypothetical of the hospital that
outsources nearly all its services. Because I doubt that the agencies could
come up with a compelling explanation for why these complex
outsourcing arrangements are more efficient in educating their
beneficiaries about debt management, the IRS conclusion in the Chief
Counsel's memo discussed earlier-that the economic arrangements
between credit counseling agencies and the "back-office service providers"
violate the private benefit proscription-likely would hold true under the
analytical model I suggest in this paper.
With respect to the down-payment assistance organizations, my
analysis requires a more rigorous rationale than what the IRS publicly
presented in Situation 2 of Revenue Ruling 2006-27.13' Recall that the
IRS's main problem in Situation 2 was that the organization in question
used a circular cash flow to help its beneficiaries-that is, the money to
provide down-payment assistance came from the seller of the property.'32
According to the IRS, this meant that the exempt organization really was
more interested in facilitating private housing sales than helping a
charitable class, thus violating the private benefit doctrine.' 33 A circular
cash flow standing alone, however, does not present a good rationale for
revoking exemption. If all that was happening in these cases is that the
exempt organization was providing a conduit to connect needy families
with housing sellers anxious to market their goods, it would be hard to see
the problem with these transactions. After all, the charitable beneficiaries
would be served in these cases by getting the down-payment assistance
and the sellers presumably would get market price for their housing. Who
cares if the money to make the arrangement work comes from the seller?
Indeed, one doubts that the IRS would have a problem with the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation making a $1 million grant to a school to help
finance the acquisition of computers that just happen to run the Microsoft

130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-21 I.R.B. 915, 2006 IRB LEXIS 207, at *3.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
See Rev. Rul. 2006-27, 2006-21 I.R.B. 915, 2006 IRB LEXIS 207, at *18.
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Windows operating system.
But some investigation of the background of this ruling reveals that the
real concern is not the circular cash flow per se; rather it is that in these
cases the charitable organization is being used as a "front" to funnel
charitable beneficiaries to sellers in order to increase the sellers' market
share and hence profits from their sales; according to the General
Accounting Office, these circular transactions often resulted in the
charitable beneficiaries paying 2-3% more for a house than in a nonassisted transaction. 134 In other words, in these cases the charitable
organization has contractual agreements with for-profit entities in which
the charitable organization agrees to exploit its beneficiaries in order to
enhance the revenues of its for-profit partners. These transactions,
therefore, fit the "exclusive dealing" paradigm in which the charity
essentially transfers some portion 6f the value of its relationship with its
charitable beneficiaries to its for-profit partners-that is, the charity
contractually agrees to "guide" its beneficiaries into transactions that
produce a supra-normal profit for the for-profit seller. In short, the charity
is giving up value that should be preserved for the charitable class. Under
the approach outlined in this paper, unless these organizations could come
up with a persuasive rationale for why steering their charitable
beneficiaries into transactions that will cost them more than the normal
market value is good for society, they should not be exempt.
This analysis shows that one of the benefits of my approach to the
private benefit doctrine is that it avoids sloppy analysis. Circular cash
flows are not necessarily bad; however, in these cases the problem is with
transactions that may extort value from the charitable class in favor of forprofit entities. It is that extortion that presents the private benefit problem,
not the circular cash flow, and the IRS's analysis in Revenue Ruling 200627 would be stronger if it acknowledged this fact.
4. Non-Economic Benefits: American CampaignAcademy
Suppose that Intel Corporation decides tomorrow that there is a woeful
lack of computer engineers skilled in applied circuit design of the type that
Intel most needs. To remedy this situation, Intel donates a wad of cash to
fund a new educational organization, the Santa Clara Graduate School of
Computer Circuit Design. The curriculum of the school is set up
specifically to train computer engineers in the applied skills that Intel

134. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, IRS Targets Down-Payment-Assistance Scams;
Seller-Funded Programs Do Not Qualify As Tax Exempt, IR-2006-74, May 4, 2006,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=156675,00.html; GOV'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE,
MORTGAGE FiNANCING: ADDrrIONAL ACTION NEEDED TO MANAGE RIsKsOFFHA-INSUREDLOANS

WiTH DowN PAYMENT ASSISTANCE 22 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0624high.pdf.
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needs. One of the three members of the board of this new entity is a senior
Intel computer engineer, another is a free lance engineer who often
consults with Intel, and the third is a local community leader.
Many of the professors are former or current Intel engineers and it so
happens that most of the graduates of this new school are employed by
Intel (not surprising, given the objectives and curriculum of the school).
But not all the graduates are employed by Intel, and there is no agreement
between the school and Intel under which Intel gets an unfair "first crack"
at school graduates. In short, there is no contractual or economic
arrangement that might be a case of a charity "under-charging" for giving
a competitive advantage to a for-profit enterprise, but neither is there any
question that the school in fact benefits Intel by training engineers in
precisely those skills most needed by Intel.
Should my hypothetical school be tax-exempt? In this scenario, what
exactly could be the complaint to bar the school from tax exemption?
Education by its nature benefits private interests; Silicon Valley certainly
benefits from the close proximity of Stanford, but no one suggests it
should lose tax exemption as a result. Many technical and professional
training programs serve as "pipelines" to particular employers; a large
proportion of the top graduates of my law school, for example, end up
being employed by a dozen large Chicago law firms. Does that make the
University of Illinois College of Law guilty of prohibited private benefit
(legally irrelevant, since we are exempt as part of state government rather
than under § 501(c)(3), but an interesting question nonetheless)? One
might argue that training individuals in skills that primarily benefit a single
employer (as opposed to multiple employers) is not charitable. But that
certainly is not the definition of "educational" in the Treasury Regulations,
which provide that "instruction or training of the individual for the purpose
of improving or developing his capabilities" is charitable.' Moreover,
even a first-year law student would recognize the "slippery slope"
problems inherent in such a line-are two employers enough? Three?
Four?
The facts of my Intel hypothetical mirror the actual facts of American
Campaign Academy,'36 and I have yet to figure out why the case was
decided as it was (maybe it was a misplaced view that the whole operation
somehow violated the prohibitions against political campaign activity,
which simply was not true'37). The notion that ill-defined secondary

135. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(a) (2006).
136. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1055-61 (1989).
137. Judge Nims complained in his opinion about the failure of ACA to operate in a
"nonpartisan" manner, id. at 1070-71, but the IRS conceded that ACA did not violate either the
lobbying or campaign activity restrictions, id. at 1063. Charitable organizations do not have to be
"nonpartisan" in the sense ofbeing politically neutral in everything they do; they only have to avoid
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benefits should override the very real primary educational purpose of ACA
did not have any basis in the law at the time the case was decided, and still
makes no sense. ACA graduates were not required to work for
Republicans and some, apparently, did not (the opinion notes that at least
one graduate worked for a candidate overseas).138 Even if one would view
training that primarily benefitted a single employer as incompatible with
tax exemption, in the ACA case the students went to work for multiple
employers (individual candidates, not the Republican Party as an entity).'3 9
The decision fares no better under my "failure-to-conserve" rationale.
Without some economic arrangement that confers a competitive advantage
to the Republican Party beyond the advantage conferred by simply training
students with the appropriate skills (an advantage conferred on all
employers by all educational organizations), it is difficult to see how the
fact that ACA graduates were overwhelmingly employed by Republican
candidates involved some failure to conserve charitable resources. ACA
could not have "charged" the Republican Party or Republican candidates
a higher price for its services, since ACA was not providing any services
to the Republican Party or candidates. 4 ° Accordingly, if one adopts the
"failure-to-conserve-assets" rationale for the private benefit doctrine,
American CampaignAcademy almost certainly is wrongly decided.

participating in political campaigns or doing more than an insubstantial amount of political
lobbying. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(3) (defining "action"
organizations).
138. Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C. at 1060.
139. See id.
140. I might approach this case differently if there was some contractual arrangement between
ACA and the Republican Party that required ACA to supply the Republican Party with a certain
number of qualified campaign operatives or permitted the Republican Party to have some kind of
special access to graduates that was denied to other potential employers, or if ACA hired only
Republican National Committee members as its faculty and licensed only Republican campaign
literature from the National Committee for use in its classes. In such a case, one might argue that
ACA had improperly "outsourced" core services (teaching and training materials) or inadequately
charged for a competitive advantage (exclusive access to students). Compare, for example, my
analysis of Example 3 in the IRS's proposed regulations on private benefit in the text infra at notes
161-65. Despite my views of the ACA case, I admit that one could view the overall relationship
between ACA and the Republican Party as being highly "incestuous," particularly given the
makeup of the governing board of ACA and the predominance of Republicans on its admissions
committee. I do not discount the fact that if my test for private benefit were used, additional fact
development in the case might have revealed that there were "side deals" in place between ACA
and the Republican Party that might have conferred a competitive advantage on the Party. This is
precisely why my approach to private benefit is needed; rather than get by with vague assertions
of too cozy a relationship between a charity and a for-profit entity, the IRS should be forced to
make at least a prima facie case why the relationship has stripped charitable beneficiaries of
resources. These facts might or might not have existed in the ACA case; we will never know, since
the current state of private benefit doctrine permits the IRS to make sloppy accusations with little,
if any, rigorous analysis.
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5. United Cancer Council
As noted above, the failure-to-conserve approach is rooted in Judge
Posner's observation in United Cancer Council that the private benefit
doctrine might cover a situation in which UCC's board had overpaid for
fundraising services. 4 ' While the focus of my approach on core services
is narrower than the general common law duty of care, and while I would
fashion a tax-law specific definition for reasonable justification that might
be somewhat more demanding of board action than current state law, 142 the
essential concepts are similar: Tax exemption law should frown on
transactions in which boards do not diligently conserve their assets for use
on the charitable class.
Though the United Cancer Council case was settled, and hence never
retried on the private benefit point, one could easily trace how the case
might be analyzed under my failure-to-conserve approach. UCC's entering
into an exclusive arrangement with a for-profit fundraiser would raise
private benefit concerns inasmuch as fundraising is not a routine business
transaction and directly affects UCC's ability to engage in core services
for its charitable beneficiaries. This in turn would then trigger the
requirement that UCC have a reasonable justification for why it entered
into a contract that gave the fundraiser over 90% of the gross amount
raised. Because the case was settled, the answer is unclear-but I note that
a variety of charities have far lower fundraising costs, 43 and therefore it
is not unreasonable to presume that UCC could have done better (and thus
conserved more assets for its charitable purpose) either by taking
fundraising in-house or by contracting with a different outside fundraiser.
6. "Excessive" Benefits to the Charitable Class: Disaster Relief
and Private Benefit
One of the more vexing problems recently faced by the IRS and
charities is how to handle disaster relief in a manner consistent with
charitable purposes. Disaster relief has long been recognized as a
charitable purpose,' 44 but after the Oklahoma City bombing and again after
the 9/11 attacks, questions arose about the ability of charities to make
economic grants (in the form of cash or property) to individuals who have

141. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 111.
143. See, e.g., Association ofFundraising Professionals, FundraisingCosts:Size, Age Matter,
AFP EWlRE, July 18, 2003, http://www.afpnet.org/ka/ka-3.cfm?folderid=2345&contentitemid
=12886 (recent study of fundraising costs showed average costs to be $.24 on every $1).
144. See Katz, A Pig in a Python, supranote 109, at 266-67; Catherine E. Livingston, Disaster
ReliefActivities of CharitableOrganizations,35 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 153, 153 (2002).
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suffered from a disaster, particularly if such grants were not to those
traditionally classified as "poor" or under some other specific financial
need.'45 At one point, the IRS had suggested that such grants might violate
the private benefit doctrine, stating in a letter to Oklahoma City charities
after the bombing there that although one did not have to be poor to be
eligible for disaster relief, "'an outright transfer of funds based solely on
an individual's involvement in a disaster or without regard to meeting the
individual's particular distress or financial needs would result in excessive
private benefit.""'1 After the 9/11 attacks, however, the IRS issued Notice
2001-78 stating that it would treat payments made by charities to disaster
victims and their families as related to the charity's exempt purpose as
47
long as such grants were made "in good faith using objective standards."'
Nevertheless, the private benefit issue raised enough concern that after
9/11 Congress enacted legislation that specifically provided that cash
grants to 9/11 victims would be considered as made for an exempt
purpose, essentially removing the private benefit analysis from payments
made for 9/11 disaster relief.148 The current IRS position on disaster relief,
however, appears to have returned to the proposition that the charity must
assessment when appropriate and to document
make some kind of "needs"
49
the basis for its grants.
In two articles published in 2003, Professor Robert Katz argued that
both state charity law and the federal tax private benefit doctrine should
be read to prohibit charities from conferring excessive financial benefits
on their beneficiaries in the context of disaster relief. 5 Although this
situation does not fall squarely into one of my two paradigms identified
above, using the failure-to-conserve rationale for private benefit validates
Professor Katz's conclusions; it also confirms both that the IRS approach
of requiring some needs assessment and documentation is exactly correct
and that the legislative approach to the 9/11 disaster was too broad. 5 '

145. JAMESJ.FISHMAN&STEPHENSCHWARZ, TAXATIONOFNONPROFITORGANIZATIONS 14546 (2d ed. 2006).
146. Livingston, supra note 144, at 154 (quoting letter from Richard Hanson, Internal Revenue
Agent, to John H. Trudgeon); see Katz, A Pig in a Python, supra note 109, at 286-87.
147. I.R.S. Notice 2001-78, 2001-2 C.B. 576, 2001 IRB LEXIS 488.
148. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 104, 115 Stat. 2427,
2431 (2002). See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 145, at 147; Katz, A Pig in a Python, supra
note 109, at 292-93; Livingston, supra note 144, at 154.
149. INTERNALREVENUESERVICE,PUBLICATION3833: DISASTERRELIEF 7-9(2005), available

at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3833.pdf.
150. Katz, A Pigin a Python,supra note 109, at 331-32; Robert A. Katz, Too Much ofa Good
Thing: When CharitableGifts Augment Victim Compensation,53 DEPAULL. REv. 547,562 (2003)
[hereinafter Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing].
151. See Katz, A Pig in a Python, supranote 109, at 331-33 (providing a much more thorough
analysis of the 9/11 situation that generally agrees with the observation in the text).
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Providing grants and other assistance to disaster victims certainly would
come within the scope of core services that a charity would provide to
beneficiaries and hence would invoke my failure-to-conserve analysis. The
question that this analysis poses is how a charity can best conserve
charitable assets for use across the charitable class. If the charitable class
is a set of disaster victims, a charity should make some reasonable effort
not to over-compensate individual victims, since doing so wastes
charitable assets that might be used for other victims (or other disasters).
As a result, charities in these situations should adopt a set of guidelines
that are geared toward making sure individual victims are not
overcompensated at the expense of other victims.'52 Needs assessment and
documentation of the basis for the relief grant should satisfy us that the
charity is not "negligently" making overcompensatory grants to
individuals, and thus would satisfy the failure-to-conserve analysis.
7. The Proposed Regulations Examples
Finally, we should compare the failure-to-conserve rationale with the
examples the IRS has presented in the new proposed regulations cited in
the introduction.'53 The first example is an organization whose purpose is
to trace the genealogy of a single family. 54
' This example, which concludes
that the organization fails the private benefit analysis, is simply a
restatement of the classic common-law version of private benefit that
relates to the size of the charitable class.' While I have no objection to
using private benefit in this manner, it creates unnecessary confusion when
a single concept such as private benefit is used to describe two very
different substantive analyses. For purposes of clarity, I would prefer,
therefore, that the IRS eliminate this as an example of private benefit and
instead use it as an example of a failure of charitable purpose (i.e., the

152. For example, Gene Steuerle has suggested that charities in this situation need not "operate
like ships in uncharted waters" and should take into account issues of progressivity (i.e., providing
progressively more relief to the less economically-well off) and horizontal equity (i.e., making sure
that victims in similar economic circumstances receive similar assistance). Gene Steuerle, Charities
and DisasterRelief, 35 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 159, 159 (2002). In Too Much of a Good Thing,
Professor Katz distinguished between the objectives of tort law and charity law, noting that while
tort law strives to make a person whole, there is nothing inherently charitable about that objective,
and that by contrast, "[floss alleviation ceases to be charitable ... if it disburses more cash than
necessary to relieve the victim's financial distress." Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing, supra note
150, at 549. Accordingly, the charitable purpose of disaster relief must necessarily focus on simply
relieving financial distress of victims, not granting them compensatory tort damages.
153. Standards for Recognition of Tax-Exempt Status if Private Benefit Exists or If an
Applicable Tax-Exempt Organization Has Engaged in Excess Benefit Transactions(s), 70 Fed. Reg.
53,599 (proposed Sept. 9, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53).
154. Id. at 53,601.
155. Id.
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organization in question has no charitable purpose, because a charitable
purpose requires serving a broad charitable class).
The second example deals with an "art museum" that displays and sells
'
only art created by "a group of unknown but promising local artists. 156
The organization has an independent board, which presumably selects the
works for display (although the example does not specifically state this),
but artists set their own prices for the art, and the organization receives a
10% "commission" from sales to cover its operating expenses.'57 The
example concludes that the direct benefits (the receipt of 90% of the sales
price) of the art constitutes an impermissible private benefit.158
While I might prefer to analyze this case as a primary
purpose/commercial activity problem,159 I also believe the facts of this
example would fit the second paradigm of the failure-to-conserve
rationale, where an exempt charity has entered into a contract giving
individuals or a for-profit entity a competitive advantage for which the
charity may have undercharged (the competitive advantage here is a place
to display and a mechanism to sell art that is limited to the works of the
local artists, in place of them displaying/selling their art through normal
commercial channels). Under my proposed analysis, therefore, the charity
would be required to present a reasonable justification for why this
arrangement appropriately conserves charitable assets for use across the
charitable class. Although the example obviously does not address this
final step, I could imagine that it would be difficult to come up with such
a justification-for example, it seems that a reasonable justification under
these circumstances would require the organization to compare its
financial arrangements with those of other art galleries; the 10%
commission may well be "below market" and hence the gallery in this case
would not properly be preserving assets for the charitable class (which in
this case is presumably the general community that gets to view and buy
the art in question). 6 °

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The example states, "Because [the organization] gives 90 percent of the proceeds from
its sole activity to the individual artists" the organization fails the private benefit
analysis-indicating that the private benefit failure is not because of the limited charitable class,
but rather because of the economic benefits flowing to the artists. Id.
159. It appears that the organization in this example is indistinguishable in its activities from
any commercial art gallery. As I note in my discussion of joint ventures, if an organization's
primary activity is simply to run a commercial business, then the organization is not exempt for
lack of a primary charitable purpose. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (2006).
160. That the commission is below market is suggested by Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976-1 C.B. 151,
1976 IRB LEXIS 621, at * 1-2, which has almost identical facts to this newly-proposed example.
In that ruling, the IRS noted that the commission charged was "substantially less than customary
commercial charges." Id., 1976 IRB LEXIS 621, at *2. If true, this would mean that the gallery in
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Finally, example three deals with an educational organization (0)
whose sole activity is to train individuals in a "program" owned by forprofit company K.' 6 ' 0 licenses the program from K, and contracts with
K to provide the training faculty and course materials. 62 Any new course
materials developed by 0 must be assigned to K at no charge if the
nonprofit ever terminates its license with K. 163 K also sets the tuition
charged by O.164 Not surprisingly, the IRS concludes that this arrangement
violates the private benefit doctrine. 6 The failure-to-conserve analysis
likely would reach a similar result. This example seems to be a
combination of my two failure-to-conserve paradigms, involving both a
contract with a for-profit conferring a competitive advantage on that forprofit (the licensing arrangement giving K free access to improvements
made by 0 upon termination of the license) and the "outsourcing"
paradigm (because 0 contracts with K for faculty and materials). As with
example two, I would expect that it would be difficult for 0 to come up
with a reasonable justification for this arrangement based upon comparable
operations of other educational organizations, which likely neither
"outsource" all their teaching, nor give away valuable course
improvements.
In sum, therefore, the latter two examples in the proposed regulations
appear compatible with the failure-to-conserve analysis. This in turn
illustrates that my proposal will not radically alter the results reached in
most private benefit cases, but will provide a specific, articulated rationale
that charities can actually understand and apply to specific circumstances.
IV. SUMMARY

Despite my past skepticism regarding the IRS's expanded definition of
private benefit, this article illustrates that there can be a well-defined,
"expanded" version of private benefit that is useful in filling analytical
gaps between the primary purpose requirement and private
inurement/§ 4958 analysis. So I "take back" at least some (but not all) of
the horrible things I have said about the private benefit doctrine in the past.
The version of private benefit sketched here, with a rationale linked to
failure to conserve charitable assets and a doctrinal implementation
focused primarily on two paradigms dealing with core services (the
question was failing to get adequate compensation for its services from the artists, and thus is
failing to conserve assets for the charitable class.
161. Standards for Recognition of Tax-Exempt Status if Private Benefit Exists, 70 Fed. Reg.
at 53,601-02.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 53,602.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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outsourcing paradigm and the competitive advantage paradigm), likely
would reach similar end results as many of the IRS rulings and cases
(though not all, as my analysis of American Campaign Academy
indicates), but would do so by providing a rigorous rationale and analytical
framework that the doctrine currently lacks. There is no reason to let the
IRS substitute an overbroad private benefit doctrine for hard analysis of
the true evils of transactions between exempt organizations and for-profit
ones, just as there is no reason to make charities or their tax advisors
operate in analytical darkness when daylight works just as well.
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